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Michael B. Gerrard
any environmental statutes had their origins
in disasters. And when disasters strike, the
environmental laws come into play in the
-response. Some have urged Congress to
adopt emergency exemptions so that the environmental
laws do not interfere with rescue and recovery.
This article explains how disasters helped create our
current statutes, and then describes the role that environ-
mental laws played in the immediate response to the
September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina. It catalogs the
multiple exemptions that already exist in the current envi-
ronmental statutes and regulations and then summarizes the
exemptions that were proposed after Hurricane Katrina.
Legislation has addressed risks in the transport and use of
hazardous chemicals since the mid-1800s, when the rail-
roads were transporting explosives and flammable materials
such as nitroglycerin. The Explosives and Combustibles
Act of 1908 gave the Interstate Commerce Commission
jurisdiction over these issues, This statute gradually evolved
over the years, but the evolution was punctuated by reac-
tions to terrible accidents. Later on, the 1967 Torrey
Canyon oil tanker spill and the 1968 Santa Barbara
Channel oil spill helped lead to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, which required the newly created
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate a
National Oil and Hazardous Materials Contingency Plan
(NCP). The 1973 crash at Logan International Airport in
Boston of a cargo jet loaded with hazardous materials high-
lighted the fragmentation of regulatory authorities and led
to enactment of the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act of 1975. Worker exposure to the chemical Kepone at a
factory in Virginia in 1975, with ensuing health damage,
helped lead to two 1976 enactments, the Toxic Substances
Control Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. The Love Canal incident in Niagara Falls in 1978
inspired the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),
which expanded the mission of the NCP to include the
cleanup of hazardous substance sites.
Most terribly, the release of methyl isocyanate at a Union
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984, killing several thou-
sand people, shortly followed by a frightening but nonlethal
release in Institute, West Virginia, led to the Emergency
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Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986
(EPCRA), requiring state and local emergency planning and
the compilation and public disclosure of extensive informa-
tion about chemical use. The Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska in
1989 led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Also enacted in
1990 were the Clean Air Act Amendments, which included
Section 112(r), requiring chemical plants to develop risk
management plans and to specify worst-case scenarios.
September 11
By the day the planes hit the World Trade Center tow-
ers on September 11, 2001, an elaborate system of exemp-
tions from the environmental laws was in place, and it was
fully utilized.
In the hours after the buildings collapsed, a massive res-
cue effort was launched in search of anyone who might
have survived. Large quantities of construction equipment
were brought in to lift the crumbled steel and shattered
concrete, and fleets of trucks and barges hauled the mate-
rial to the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island, where offi-
cials searched for human remains and for forensic evi-
dence. The landfill had been scheduled to close by
December 31, 2001, by operation of a state law enacted in
1996 and accompanying consent decrees, and in fact it
had stopped accepting waste in March 2001. The closure
was brought on by the landfill's negative environmental
effects and not by a lack of physical capacity. It suddenly
reopened with little or no legal formality to accommodate
WTC debris. The total quantity of WTC material
brought to Fresh Kills-more than 1 million tons-was
more than the amount of construction and demolition
(C&D) debris that all municipal solid waste (MSW) land-
fills in New York State accept in a year.
The debris that went to Fresh Kills included material
that ordinarily could not lawfully be disposed at a C&D or
MSW landfill, and would need to go to facilities specially
designed for hazardous, asbestos, or petroleum wastes. The
task of separating the material would have been extremely
laborious, and would have slowed down the disposal oper-
ation, and exposed the workers to further hazards.
In theory, many of these demolition, transport, and dis-
posal operations may have violated environmental laws.
Environmental impact review, advance notice of asbestos
removal, source separation, and many other procedures
would ordinarily be required for a large demolition project.
None of these legal procedures were followed, and no one
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said a thing. No environmental agency or advocacy group
would dare try to interfere with the rescue effort. In short,
the environmental laws worked as they should have under
such extreme circumstances-they got out of the way.
A New York State statute provides that
[s]ubject to the state constitution, the federal constitution
and federal statutes and regulations.., the governor may by
executive order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any
statute, local law, ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations, or
parts thereof, of any agency during a state disaster emergency,
if compliance with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or
delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.
Governor George Pataki used this law on September 12 to
suspend many statutes of limitations, and on October 9 he
used it to suspend certain regulations regarding transporta-
tion and handling of solid wastes, so as to facilitate the
WTC removal operation.
The regulations under the State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA) exempt from the environmental
impact statement (EIS) requirement "emergency actions that
are immediately necessary on a limited and temporary basis
for the protection or preservation of life, health, property or
natural resources, provided that such actions are directly
related to the emergency and are performed to cause the least
change or disturbance, practicable under the circumstances,
to the environment." 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.5(c)(33). The
courts have interpreted this provision broadly to encompass
events that at first glance do not look much like emergencies
(such as prison overcrowding and homelessness), but obvi-
ously the response to the WTC disaster fit squarely within
this definition. Emergency provisions were invoked to allow
solid waste transfer stations to handle the large quantities of
garbage that backed up when much transportation in the city
ground to a halt, and to expedite dredging (long delayed by
fear of contaminated sediments) to create new berths in
Manhattan and Brooklyn to accommodate the barges that
took away some of the debris.
At the federal level, certain exemptions were triggered by
the declaration of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) on September 11 that New York City was
a disaster area. Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, the federal emergency
response is largely exempt from the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), SEQRAs federal counterpart.
Congress granted an extension from compliance with
certain transportation conformity requirements of the
Clean Air Act, largely because the metropolitan planning
organization in charge of this planning process was housed
at the World Trade Center; its files and work papers were
destroyed and several of its employees were killed.
Within a few days after the attacks it became clear that
there were no remaining survivors, and the rescue opera-
tion ended. The removal of the smoldering debris, and
the human remains within, then continued without delays
caused by environmental permitting requirements.
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The first building to be reconstructed at the site was 7
World Trade Center, situated north of the twin towers; it col-
lapsed on the afternoon of September 11, but it had been
completely evacuated and there was no loss of life there. Its
replacement was designed to be thinner and taller, so that a
street that had been cut off by the original construction could
be reopened. An environmental assessment was prepared
under SEQRA, with a state agency, the Empire State
Development Corporation (ESPC), acting as lead agency. It
bcre clear, however, that the SEQRA process was about to
delay the start of construction by a few months. This was a
serious matter, because 7 World Trade Center had been built
atop a Consolidated Edison Co. electrical substation that pro-
vided electricity to much of Lower Manhattan. Until that
substation could be rebuilt, electricity service was provided
through a jerry-rigged system of cables running on the surface
of the streets. This was an intrinsically unstable situation.
Thus ESDC invoked SEQRA's emergency provision and
allowed site preparation activities to go forward before the
completion of the SEQRA process. Ultimately ESDC decid-
ed that no EIS was necessary, as the new 7 WTC, though
taller than the original, had less square footage and therefore
it generated less traffic and sewage, used less water and energy,
and otherwise had fewer impacts. Thus SEQRA did not
delay the reconstruction of 7 World Trade Center.
No emergency was declared for the replacement of the
office space in the twin towers and of the nearby road-
ways, commuter railway terminal and subway stations, and
the construction of a memorial to the victims of the
attacks. Four full EISs were prepared covering all this
work. They were processed under a combination of
SEQRA and NEPA, since federal financial assistance was
involved. The reconstruction has endured a series of
delays, but none caused by the SEQRA and NEPA
processes. Instead, disputes over the design, financing,
and security measures caused these delays. The formal
environmental review process (in which the author partic-
ipated as environmental counsel to the holder of the
ground lease to the World Trade Center site, Silverstein
Properties) provided an important forum for the systemat-
ic examination of the many environmental issues that
arose in the design of the project.
Many environmental controversies have surrounded
the recovery and reconstruction efforts at the World Trade
Center site. The most contentious probably concern
whether EPA gave full information to nearby residents
and to recovery workers about the nature of lingering air
pollution. Several cases on this issue are still being litigat-
ed. However, none of this has seriously delayed the
reconstruction efforts.
Hurricane Katrina
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina swept across
coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi. The levees pro-
tecting New Orleans broke, leaving much of the city
flooded. More than 1,400 died.
Even before landfall, Governor Kathleen Blanco of
Louisiana and Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi both
declared that a state of emergency existed. On the day
the hurricane hit, FEMA declared both states to be disas-
ter areas. A flurry of emergency orders ensued, exempting
various operations from the standard environmental
requirements.
As soon as the storm left, there was an immediate need
to drain the floodwaters. The fastest way was pumping
the water and discharging it into Lake Pontchartrain.
That ordinarily would have required a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permit under the Clean
Water Act. However, Section 311 (c) of the Clean Water
Act authorizes the President to "ensure immediate and
effective removal" of discharges from onshore facilities of
oil and hazardous substances that pose substantial threats
to public health or welfare. EPA determined that exemp-
tion applied, since there were numer-
ous industrial facilities, sewer systems,
and oil and hazardous substance dis-
charges in the flooded areas.
Much of the immediate recovery
work also involved depositing materi-
als in wetlands. That ordinarily -'
requires a permit under Section 404
of the Clean Water Act. The Corps
of Engineers invoked emergency pro-
cedures to waive or modify the per-
mitting requirements for emergency
response work.
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 91, 27
Rita, which followed less than a
month later, disrupted the major oil 411 1
and gas production and refining
industries on the Gulf Coast. Thus,
various kinds of fuels and fuel addi-
tives could not be produced in the
needed quantities. EPA granted four
kinds of waivers from Clean Air Act
requirements. It waived the volatility requirements that
apply to gasoline sold during the summer driving season; it
waived the requirement that diesel fuel sold for use in on-
road vehicles contain no more than 500 parts per million
of sulfur; it waived the requirement that certain cities use
reformulated gasoline; and it waived certain low-sulfur
gasoline requirements that apply to the Atlanta area.
Additionally, EPA used its enforcement discretion and
issued "no action assurances" to allow certain actions that
would otherwise violate the Clean Air Act. This includ-
ed, for example, rules regarding vapor recovery at gasoline
pumps, and certification rules for tank truck carriers.
Similarly the states issued many waivers. The
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, for
example, granted relief from the rules applicable to waste-
water discharges; air emissions relating to repair activities
and temporary power sources; on-site solid and hazardous
waste management; inspection and rehabilitation of
underground storage tanks; and numerous inspection,
monitoring, and discharge reporting requirements.
Thousands of buildings have to be demolished because
the water has rendered them uninhabitable, and often
structurally unstable. Ordinarily such demolition must be
preceded by an asbestos inspection and, if asbestos is
found, advance notice to EPA and special removal proce-
dures. This would have greatly impeded the work, and in
many cases would have exposed demolition workers to
unsafe conditions. Thus this requirement was enforced
flexibly (though not as flexibly as some Louisiana officials
would have liked). Efforts were made to remove household
appliances that contained freon and other ozone-depleting
compounds and recover these gases, but this requirement
too was bypassed when the work would have been haz-
ardous to workers. Demolition was delayed by a lawsuit
against the City of New Orleans over the adequacy of
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notification to residents of demoli-
tion, but this was not brought under
the environmental laws.
Immense quantities of debris from
the hurricanes have to be removed-
two orders of magnitude more than
that involved at the WTC site.
Many financial, manpower, political
and bureaucratic hurdles have
delayed this removal. Environmental
rules are among the factors involved.
The environmental regulations
were also enforced flexibly in allow-
ing some businesses that had been
shut down by the floodwaters to
reopen. Many facilities needed emer-
gency power generators, new water
supply wells, sewage treatment vari-
ances, and other items that would
ordinarily take many months, but
that were greatly expedited after the
hurricanes.
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All in all, it appears that the emergency response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita-like that to the 9/11
attacks-was not inhibited by the environmental laws.
Exemptions or waivers were granted, or the authorities
simply looked the other way.
As with 9/11 as well, reconstruction of the areas devas-
tated by the hurricanes has faced numerous challenges-
engineering, financial, economic, political, legal, and
emotional. Indeed, the area destroyed by the hurricanes is
far larger, and the challenges are far more complex, than
those involved after 9/11. NEPA will apply to much of
the work. Neither Louisiana nor Mississippi has a "little
NEPA" law like New York's SEQRA (though Louisiana
has other mechanisms for requiring similar kinds of envi-
ronmental review). To date it does not appear that NEPA
or other environmental laws have stood in the way of
reconstruction, except for some delays in demolition due
to EPA's enforcement of the asbestos rules.
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The decisions about just how to rebuild, and in what
sequence and at what pace, remain ahead. The shape of
the environmental review process to be followed has also
not been determined. However, it is clear that the magni-
tude of the disaster had been greatly increased by a long
history of poor environmental decisions with respect to
flood protection, destruction of coastal wetlands, and
other items. Thus making new decisions without due
regard of the serious environmental issues involved would
mean that little had been learned from the catastrophe.
Exemptions in Place
The emergency exemptions in environmental law fall
into two broad categories-the generic and the case-spe-
cific. The generic exemptions, in turn, come in four
types: exemptions from permitting requirements; relax-
ation of substantive standards; exemptions from, or accel-
eration of, certain processes; and releases from liability.
The case-specific exemptions are aimed at specific projects
or geographic areas. Examples included congressional dec-
larations of nonnavigability that shield certain areas from
Corps of Engineers permitting requirements, and congres-
sional and state legislative declarations that certain proj-
ects need not go through the standard environmental
review process.
Few of these exemptions are self-executing. Most
require a declaration or finding of the administrator of
EPA (either acting on her own authority, or under a dele-
gation from the President) or of another high federal offi-
cial. In the absence of such a federal action, regulated
entities generally cannot simply plead that the environ-
mental laws do not apply to them. A notable exception is
the act of God or war defense that is found in most of the
federal statutes that confer environmental liability.
Before listing the statutes that are aimed at specific envi-
ronmental conditions, three overarching laws should be
mentioned. NEPA is a procedural overlay applicable to
most federal actions of environmental significance. The text
of NEPA contains no emergency exemptions. However, the
implementing regulations of the Council on Environmental
Quality authorize lead agencies to make "alternative
arrangements" in emergency situations. 40 C.ER. § 1506.11.
For disasters and other emergencies abroad, Executive Order
12,114 provides (in Section 2-5) for exemptions from envi-
ronmental review requirements for relief action.
The National Historic Preservation Act applies to a
broad array of federal actions. It provides for disaster
waivers from some of its requirements, 16 U.S.C. § 470h-
2(j). The regulations of the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation also provide for emergency procedures. 36
C.ER. §§ 78, 800.12.
The third overarching statute is the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. In addi-
tion to giving many powers to FEMA, it provides a NEPA
exemption for immediate response actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5159, 44 C.ER. § 10.8. It also gives the President the
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authority to clear debris and wreckage resulting from
major disasters. 42 U.S.C. § 5173(a).
Most of the substantive environmental laws and their
implementing regulations contain emergency exemptions
of various sorts.
The Clean Air Act has at least nine, most of which, as
noted above, were invoked after Hurricane Katrina. The
available waivers include:
* from emission restrictions for fuel burning stationary
sources during national or regional energy emergencies, 42
U.S.C. § 7410(f);
* from national emission standards for hazardous air
pollutants from stationary sources when in the interests of
national security, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i)(4);
e from fuel additive requirements during emergencies,
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(C);
- from transportation conformity requirements during
emergencies or natural disasters, 40 C.ER. § 51.853;
for federal emission sources where "in the paramount
interest of the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 7418;
* from certain of the requirements under the National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for the
demolition of asbestos-containing buildings, when the
building has been ordered torn down because it "is struc-
turally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse," 40
C.FR. § 61.145(a)(3);
* for Defense Department vehicles due to national
security, 42 U.S.C. § 7588(e);
* for federal procurement when in the paramount
national interest, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(d); and
v from chlorofluorocarbon Class 1 phase-out to protect
national security interests, 42 U.S.C. § 767 lc(f).
The Clean Water Act and its regulations have at least
six exemptions. These are:
* act of God or war, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12);
* during upset ("an exceptional incident in which
there is unintentional and temporary noncompliance with
technology based permit effluent limitations because of
factors beyond the reasonable control of the permittee"),
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(1);
* emergencies that require expedited procedures for
the processing of permit applications by the Corps of
Engineers, 33 C.ER. § 325.2(e)(4);
* emergencies requiring expedited direct action by the
Corps, 33 C.F.R. § 337.7; and
* exigent discharges of oil and hazardous substances,
33 U.S.C. § 1321(c), 40 C.ER. § 122.3(d).
CERCLA also has an act of God or war defense. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1). Additionally, it allows:
* emergency removal actions, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), 40
C.FR. § 300.440;
* relaxation of remedial standards if compliance
"would result in greater risk to human health," 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(4); and
* exemptions for Department of Energy and
Department of Defense facilities based on national securi-
ty, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j).
The Coastal Zone Management Act allows the
President to authorize federal actions that are inconsistent
with state coastal plans if the President finds it is in the
paramount interest of the country, or the Secretary of
Commerce determines it is a matter of national security.
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c).
The Endangered Species Act allows otherwise prohibit-
ed "takes" of protected species in federal disaster areas, 16
U.S.C. § 1533, and streamlines or waives consultation for
repair or replacement of public facilities in such areas, 16
U.S.C. § 1536.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act allows EPA to exempt federal and state agencies from
any requirement of the statute if EPA determines that
emergency conditions exist that require such exemption. 7
U.S.C. § 136p, 40 C.F.R. § 166.2.
The Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act,
also known as the Ocean Dumping Act, allows emergency
dumping of industrial wastes when EPA has found an
emergency requires it. 33 U.S.C. § 1412a. It also allows
vessels to scuttle cargo and waste during emergencies. 40
C.ER. § 220.
The Oil Pollution Act has an act of God or war
defense. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
The Noise Control Act allows exemptions for reasons
of national security, 42 U.S.C. § 4909(b)(1).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allows
the President to determine it to be in the "paramount
interest" of the nation to exempt any federal solid waste
management facility. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a). This authori-
ty also extends to federal underground storage tanks. 42
U.S.C. § 6991f(a). EPA may issue temporary emergency
permits to allow treatment, storage or disposal of haz-
ardous wastes where there is imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health or the environment. 40
C.ER. § 270.61(a). The standards applicable to treat-
ment, storage, and disposal facilities may also give way in
time of emergency. 40 C.ER. § 264.1(g)(8).
The Safe Drinking Water Act allows states to exempt
public water supply systems from maximum contaminant
levels due to "compelling factors," including "urgent
threats to public health." 42 U.S.C. § 300g-5.
The Toxic Substances Control Act allows EPA to go to
court for seizure of an imminently hazardous chemical sub-
stance or mixture, or for relief against anyone who manu-
factures, processes, distributes, uses, or disposes of such
material. 15 U.S.C. § 2606.
The Wilderness Act allows road-building in wilderness
areas during emergencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
Proposed Legislation
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
Congress passed and President Bush signed several emer-
gency funding laws. These were not especially controver-
sial, though there was some debate about the appropriate
amounts.
Considerable controversy, however, attended a num-
ber of bills that attempted to create additional exemp-
tions from the environmental laws. For example, S.
1711, introduced on September 15, 2005, by Senator
James Inhofe (R-Okla.) would allow EPA, in consulta-
tion with the governor of the affected state, to waive or
modify for a period of 120 days the application of any
requirement that is contained in any statute or regula-
tion that is administered by EPA, if the administrator
finds that such action is necessary to respond to
Hurricane Katrina, and makes a number of related
findings.
More narrowly targeted was S. 1709, the Gulf Coast
Water Infrastructure Emergency Assistance Act of 2005,
which dealt with the funding of drinking water projects.
Other bills, including S. 1765, introduced by Senator
Mary Landrieu (D-La.), and S. 1766, introduced by
Senator David Vitter (R-La.), both entitled the Louisiana
Katrina Reconstruction Act, would have allowed waivers
from environmental laws to facilitate reconstruction.
The House narrowly passed the Gasoline for America's
Security Act, H.R. 3893, which would have waived
numerous Clean Air Act requirements.
As of the writing of this article, in March 2006, none
of these exemptions has been enacted into law. The
impetus for them appears to have dissipated as it has
become clear that, of all the serious impediments facing
response to the hurricanes in the Gulf Coast, environmen-
tal laws were very low on the list, and Congress has been
distracted by other priorities.
The American Bar Association's Section of
Environment, Energy, and Resources submitted detailed
comments to EPA in November 2005 expressing reserva-
tions about expanded exemptions. The comments con-
cluded "that the risks accompanying blanket exemptions
to environmental regulations should not be removed with-
out individual consideration of the dangers at issue," and
that "broad exemptions carry significant costs and risks as
well, which deserve individual and serious scrutiny before
action is taken to eliminate environmental protections."
The Section opposed legislation that authorizes or creates
broad exemptions or waivers of federal or state environ-
mental laws. The Section's report included an extensive
analysis of the existing environmental exemptions. (The
listing contained in this article is drawn in part from that
report.)
Both the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina
led to horrific loss of life and considerable environmental
damage. Recovery from both has been, and continues
to be, a long and difficult process. However, thanks to
an ample supply of existing exemptions, the environmen-
tal laws have not been a major impediment to recovery,
and have actually assisted in the systematic assessment
of the best courses of action. This experience should
be borne in mind if future disasters lead to renewed
calls for further exemptions from the environmental
laws.
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